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Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers is a prevalent issue within UN 
peacekeeping missions. As of January 2015, the UN Misconduct Tracking System (MTS) began 
recording the nationalities of alleged SEA perpetrators. This thesis fills the gap in literature and 
analyzes the relationship between the nationalities of uniformed personnel from troop 
contributing countries (TCCs) and their subsequent SEA perpetration; furthermore, whether or 
not there are other factors within the TCCs, such as societal norms of gender inequality, 
underreporting of sexual violence and attitudes of impunity, that help explicate the variation in 
SEA are explored. The findings yielded alarming proportions for certain nationalities 
perpetrating SEA and found that TCCs were responsible for the majority of overall SEA 
perpetrated (from the data available); this research shows that both developing and developed 
countries are perpetrators of SEA and that their actions are detrimental to the UN’s broader 
gender-equality and peacebuilding goals. Furthermore, knowing the nationalities and the rates at 
which countries perpetrate SEA complicates the UN’s relationship with these TCCs, as these 
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Introduction 
The sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of young women and girls perpetrated by male 
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping personnel is an endemic issue.1 SEA detrimentally affects 
and hinders the peacebuilding process, as peacekeepers are violating the very rights that they are 
supposed to uphold and help implement. As such, this human rights violation undermines the 
overall legitimacy of peacekeeping operations (PKO), questions the efficacy of the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), poses physical and psychological trauma to victims, 
threatens the underlying fabric of human security in communities and ultimately results in locals 
not taking peacekeeping seriously.2 Furthermore, it perpetrates patriarchal values and militarized 
masculinity, whilst compromising the promotion of gender equality in host countries.3 It is one 
of the “most conspicuous and consequential departures from the ideals” of the UN that occurs 
regularly within all peacekeeping mission types.4  
Until now, country specific case studies, the effects of male dominance, and militarized 
masculinity have been at the forefront of discussions about sexual exploitation and abuse. As of 
January 2015, the UN began tracking allegations of misconduct by nationality of uniformed 
personnel.5 As such, this data is fairly new and TCCs have only started to be ‘named and 
shamed’ for perpetrating SEA; few if any studies have conducted statistical TCCs case analyses 
specifically pertaining to the nationality of peacekeepers. Therefore, my research fills this 
existing gap in literature and determines whether there is a relationship between TCCs’ societal 
                                                   
1SEA can be committed by women as well as men and both men and women can be victims. Regardless of the fact that male dominance and 
militarized masculinity are delineated as common causes of SEA perpetration, this is not a problem that is unique to male offenders. Sabrina 
Karim and Kyle Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” Journal of Peace Research 53 (2016): 102, 
accessed May 23, 2017, doi: 10.1177/0022343315615506. 
2 Ibid., 101. 
3 Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” 100. 
4 Office of Internal Oversight Services: Inspection and Evaluation Division, “Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the United Nations and Related Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations,” OIOS IED-15-001 (2015): 7, accessed 
July 25, 2017. 
5 United Nations General Assembly, Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation 
and Sexual Abuse, 13 February 2015, A/69/779. 
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gender norms and SEA. Do peacekeepers externalize the norms that they have grown 
accustomed to in their home countries? In this research, certain countries were found to be 
substantially responsible for perpetrating more SEA than other TCCs; one must question if TCCs 
home norms can explain the paradox of peacekeepers choosing to harm whilst on a mission to 
keep the peace. I hypothesize that TCCs that demonstrate questionable efforts to bettering gender 
equality, poor women’s rights prioritization and an overall toxic male culture, will have a higher 
rate of SEA allegations against their peacekeeping personnel.  
 SEA is a gross violation of human rights and has been addressed multiple times by the 
UN; there are clear rules set out in the 2003 Secretary-General’s bulletin.6 The bulletin outlines a 
zero-tolerance policy of any and all SEA by peacekeepers and other personnel. In this report, 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan states, “sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian staff 
cannot be tolerated. It violates everything the United Nations stands for. Men, women, and 
children displaced by conflict or other disasters are among the most vulnerable people on earth. 
They look to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for shelter and protection.”7 
Standards and protocols for UN peacekeeping personnel can be found within UN Security 
Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960 and 2122.8 The concept of SEA is also 
specifically addressed in mission-specific mandates.9 
                                                   
6 United Nations Secretariat, Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, 9 October 2003, ST/SGB/2003/13. 
7 Muna Ndolu, “The United Nations Responses to The Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women And Girls By Peacekeepers During 
Peacekeeping Missions,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 27(2009): 130. 
8 Bernd Beber, Michael J. Gilligan, Jenny Guardado, and Sabrina Karim, “Peacekeeping, Compliance with International Norms, and 
Transactional Sex in Monrovia, Liberia,” International Organization 71, no. 1 (2017): 22. doi:10.1017/S0020818316000242. 
9 Ibid., 1. 
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Background Information 
Peacekeeping  
Studies suggest that UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are successful in achieving 
core security aims.10 However, the price in attaining these objectives results in less than 
favorable outcomes to a mission’s other peace building goals of social and economic 
development.11 The role of peacekeepers is “to support the implementation of a ceasefire or 
peace agreement, play an active role in peacemaking efforts and… also be involved in early 
peacebuilding activities.”12 Today’s peacekeeping efforts involve conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement. It is a multi-dimensional 
operation that works to facilitate the following: rebuilding of a community; protecting civilians; 
assisting in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; supporting 
the organization of elections; protecting and promoting human rights; assisting in restoring the 
rule of law.13  
Peacekeeping has evolved significantly over the years and now involves parties other 
than peacekeepers; civilian components, such as electoral observation, police monitoring and 
training and civilian administration, are heavily relied upon.14 According to Page Fortna, there 
are four types of peacekeeping missions: observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, 
multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.15 Observer missions involve small 
groups of unarmed personnel whose mandates are to monitor particular situations, such as 
ceasefires. Traditional peacekeeping missions involve observers and lightly armed military 
                                                   
10 Beber et. al., 1. 
11 Ibid., 2. 
12 “UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines,” United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operation, last modified January 
2008, 16, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf.  
13 “UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines,” 6. 
14 Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War,” International 
Studies Quarterly 48 (2004): 271, doi: 10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00301. 
15 Ibid. 
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units.16 Multidimensional peacekeeping missions supplement traditional peacekeeping forces 
with “large civilian components to monitor elections, train or monitor police, monitor human 
rights, and sometimes temporarily to administer the country.”17 Lastly, enforcement missions are 
mandated to impose peace by force. Each of these mission types are authorized under the UN 
Charter, however, the use of force is only authorized in two of the four mission types – 
traditional and peace enforcement.18  
Even though force is only permissible in peace enforcement and traditional mission types, 
the use of force still falls within a grey area as to when and why peacekeepers can use it. This is 
because it is the responsibility of every individual peacekeeper to carry out duties of both 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, regardless of mission type. Peacekeepers are allowed to 
“use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-
defense and defense of the mandate.”19 If acting within the scope of “peace enforcement,” and 
not “peacekeeping,” consent of main parties is not necessary and personnel “may involve the use 
of military force at the strategic or international level.”20 Even though force is to always be used 
as a last resort in a manner that is proportional and appropriate to the situation, the confusion of 
when to use force is largely left unto a peacekeeper’s discretion to determine if a situation 
requires it.21 Peacekeepers who commit SEA can take advantage of misinterpreting when the use 
of force is permissible, in order to lay some sort of reasoning behind committing SEA.22 
Defining this grey area is important since the use of force plays a role in peacekeepers 
                                                   
16 Fortna, 271. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Observer, traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping missions are authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Enforcement missions 
are authorized under Chapter VII. Fortna, 271. 
19 “UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines,” 33. 
20 “UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines,” 34-35. 
21 Fortna, 271. 
22 Anne Betts Fetherston, “UN Peacekeepers and Cultures of Violence,” Cultural Survival Quarterly, 19 (1995), accessed 
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/un-peacekeepers-and-cultures-violence.  
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committing SEA; it changes the power dynamics in the communities – sexual violence and use 
of force go hand in hand. 
  
Makeup of Peacekeeping Personnel  
The UN’s peacekeepers include military contingents, police and civilian personnel. As of 
March 2017, the number of armed uniformed personnel, which includes troops, military 
observers and police, working in the current DPKO missions is 96, 477 individuals. There are 
currently 4,784 international civilian personnel and 9,474 local civilian staff.23  
For the purpose of contextualization of which type of UN peacekeeping personnel 
perpetrate SEA, uniformed personnel have the highest number of allegations made against them. 
Uniformed personnel include troops, military observers and police personnel and they are armed 
with weapons. Conversely, non-uniformed personnel include civilians and local volunteers. 
Civilians and volunteers are typically unarmed.24 Of the 69 allegations made in 2015, 38 noted 
military contingents as perpetrators. Similarly, in 2013, of the 152 allegations made, 117 of those 
were also against military contingents.25 Allowing peacekeepers to use weapons has changed the 
power dynamics in the field. Women who have experienced SEA have been threatened with 
weapons to engage in transactional and survival sex, rape, and other abuses, even though 
peacekeepers are only technically allowed to use their weapons in self-defense.26 SEA and armed 
military peacekeeping personnel are correlated, it is my assumption that this is directly 
attributable to a peacekeeper’s ability to use force on the field.  
 
                                                   
23 United Nations Code Blue Campaign,  “UN Documents,” United Nations, last modified 2017, http://www.codebluecampaign.com/un-docs/.  
24 United Nations Department of Public Information, “50 Years of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” United Nations, n.d., 
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/50years/2.htm.  
25 UN General Assembly, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, 16 February 2016, A/70/729, 3. 
26 “UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines,” 33-35. 
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Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries (TCC/PCC) 
Since the UN does not have a standing reserve force, the supply of military, civilian and 
police peacekeeping personnel come from troop-contributing countries (TCC)/police-
contributing countries (PCC). The Security Council works with TCCs to ensure that UN 
peacekeeping reflects a truly global partnership. These military and police contingents  “are first 
and foremost members of their own national services and are then seconded to work with the 
UN.”27 Presently, there are peacekeeping personnel from over 90 TCCs.28 The UN applauds the 
diversity of this group and unequivocally states that the peacekeepers “bring different cultures 
and experiences… [and even so] are united in their determination to foster peace” and security.29  
Although TCCs are responsible for all troop allocation decisions, their “priorities are not 
necessarily in line with those of the UN Security Council or UN Secretariat.”30 TCCs allocate 
troops depending on various rationales concerning political, economic, security, institutional and 
normative concerns – there are distinct potential beneficiaries with each decision made.31 TCCs 
weigh these factors according to their own priorities. For example, one factor that has been 
highly discussed in previous literature is the UN’s compensation payment of $1,028 per soldier 
per month to TCCs.32 An individual peacekeeper’s TCC decides how much is given to personnel 
as a salary.33 This form of payment per soldier deployed has resulted in “developing states with 
large populations… providing the largest share of peacekeepers;” richer countries often choose 
to pay for missions as opposed to sending militaries.34 However, this also means that “the 
                                                   
27“UN Peacekeeping Military,” United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operation, N.d, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/military.  
28 “UN Peacekeeping Contributors,” United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operation, N.d, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml  
29 Ibid. 
30 Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, “Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping 
Contributions,” Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013, 3. 
31 Bellamy and Williams, 3. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Bellamy and Williams, 4 
34 Vincenzo Bove and Andrea Ruggeri, “Kinds of Blue: Diversity in UN Peacekeeping Missions and Civilian Protection,” British Journal of 
Political Science 46 (2016): 694, doi: 10.1177/0022343311418265.  
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increased proportion of  troops from developing countries increases the likelihood that 
peacekeepers arrive…lacking necessary equipment” and/or necessary skills.35 
The UN is legally bound by the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which serve as pacts between the UN and the host 
country or TCC, respectively (see Diagram 2 in “International Human Rights” section). The 
legal status of UN personnel is a complex and highly contested issue. Military and police 
contingents are strictly under the criminal jurisdiction of their own national authorities, not the 
local authorities of host countries. The MOU stipulates that a TCC will “meet its responsibility to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over national personnel in return for immunity from local 
prosecution.”36 Yet, this agreement is not legally binding and TCCs are not required by law to 
undertake this responsibility.  
Due to military and police contingent status, the UN does not have legal authority to draw 
up criminal charges or initiate prosecution of SEA, and as such must rely on repatriation with the 
hopes that TCCs will take legal action according to their rule of law. This means that the UN 
relies on “the will and capacity of the country of origin” to prosecute perpetrators.37 Once alleged 
perpetrators are repatriated, the UN has no influence on TCCs national authorities, nor is the UN 
privy to follow up reports on whether charges were filed. Unfortunately, investigating allegations 
are often “stymied due to a lack of information about… suspects and a lack of transparency [by 
the TCC] about investigations and prosecutions.”38 Furthermore, other TCCs/PCCs lack the 
legislation to prosecute their peacekeepers after repatriation for crimes committed in foreign 
                                                   
35 Bove and Ruggeri, 685. 
36 Chiykui Aoi, Cedric de Conig and Ramesh Thakur, “Unintended  Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations,” United Nations University Press 
(2007): 49. Available at: https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:2483/pdf9789280811421.pdf.  
37 Ibid., 49. 
38 Human Rights Watch, UN: Stop Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers, 4 March 2016, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/04/un-stop-
sexual-abuse-peacekeepers.  
  8 
lands.39 Diagram 1, provided by UN Peacekeeping, illustrates how the aforementioned 
management of SEA reports and allegations works. 
 
The current system allows for a sense of impunity and substantial gap in accountability to 
flourish, which in turn allows others to commit SEA without fear of retribution. One would like 
to hope that within the UN framework, perpetrators would be held accountable to the human 
rights foundation, a system that peacekeepers work to uphold.  
 
International Human Rights  
Peacekeeping personnel are by law required to act in accordance with all human rights 
treaties, regardless of what their TCC or host country has ratified – the Convention on the Rights 
                                                   
39 Aoi, Conig and Thakur, 49. 
Diagram 1: “SEA Infographic” Management of Reports and Allegations Involving UN Personnel in Peacekeeping and Special 
Political Missions 
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of the Child (CRC), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), 
Convention on the Elimination and Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), International 
Covenant on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and all other relevant 
instruments.  This is to ensure that peacekeepers do not become perpetrators of human rights 
abuses. According to the UN DPKO’s guidelines, “personnel should respect human rights in 
their dealings with colleagues and with local people, both in their public and in their private 
lives. Where they commit abuses, they should be held accountable.”40 These guidelines lay out a 
clear expectation of peacekeepers taking responsibility for their actions and acting in accordance 
to regulations.   
Scholars utilize the Hague Convention of 1907 as a starting point in case study analyses 
to “grasp how sexual violence has been viewed over time and whether or not there has been a 
change in perspective;” the Hague Convention of 1907 is the first international treaty that 
“implicitly outlaws sexual violence.”41 Post World War II, the tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
did not prosecute sexual violence and the use of “comfort women.”42 At the time, sexual 
violence was viewed as “unfortunate but unavoidable consequences of war.”43 However, this 
‘boys will be boys’ stance soon changed.44 The passage of UNSC Resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 
1889, and 1960, as well as the rulings within the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, set the precedent for classifying 
                                                   
40 “UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines,” 15. 
41 UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “Crimes of Sexual Violence,” ICTY, n.d., available at: 
http://www.icty.org/en/in-focus/crimes-sexual-violence.  
42 Muna Ndolu, “The United Nations Responses to The Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women And Girls By Peacekeepers During 
Peacekeeping Missions,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 27(2009), 131. 
43 Ibid., 131.  
44 Sarah Martin, “Must Boys Be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions,” Refugees International, October 
2005, 6. 
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sexual violence as crimes against humanity by defining gender crimes, such as rape, sexual 
torture and sexual enslavement, as customary law.4546  
Regardless of the categorization of international human rights framework as binding or 
non-binding, peacekeepers must abide by, uphold and help implement all international human 
rights instruments.47  For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) “sets the 
cornerstone of international human rights standards, [and] emphasizes that human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are universal and guaranteed to everybody.”48 Although the UDHR is 
technically non-binding, the UN is able to reconcile the use of this framework because it is 
treated as customary soft law that provides the basis of respect and dignity for all humans. Other 
treaties, such as ICCPR, ICESCR and CEDAW are in “recognition of the inherent dignity and of 
the equal and inalienable rights” in their preambles and are legally binding. ICCPR’s Article 7 
notes that, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment” – SEA is degrading, inhuman, cruel, and is considered torture in some instances 
(i.e. rape). ICESCR’s Article 3 works to “ensure the equal right of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights.” CEDAW notably provides protection 
against “sexual and gender-based violence, including by establishing safeguards against sexual 
violence as a result of gender-based discrimination.”49 Yet, even in infringing upon others’ rights 
                                                   
45 Susan Notar, “Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.” American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 14(2006): 413. 
46 Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers 
and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries,” Journal of Peace Research 53 (2016): 100. This change in customary law was also noted in the 
1949 Geneva Conventions: “Women shall be especially protected … against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.” 
47 This is written in mission mandates. Although treaties apply to countries and not individuals, peacekeepers are representing their countries and 
the DPKO’s guidelines clearly state that peacekeepers must abide by and uphold all international human rights treaties. 
48 “UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines,” 14. The UDHR, although non-binding, is cited in scholarly works as well. This is to 
show that the UN views the UDHR as a part of the universally recognized legal norms that peacekeepers must be held to. This can be found in: 
Susan Notar, “Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” 
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 14(2006): 423-425. 
49 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Context of Transitional Justice,” 
United Nations, October 2014, 1. 
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and being in violation of the aforementioned binding and non-binding international human rights 
framework, peacekeepers seldom face consequences for perpetrating SEA.50 
The UN has made its position clear with both its TCC and host countries. Diagram 2 
outlines these relationships. There is the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which exists 
between the UN and the host state, and the Memorandum of Understanding Agreement (MOU), 
which is a binding agreement between the UN and the troop-contributing country (TCC). 
Furthermore, there are mission-based Codes of Conduct, a Voluntary Compact, and other rules 
governing disciplinary measures for SEA as outlined in the 2003 Secretary General’s Bulletin on 
Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. 
The rules and regulations for peacekeepers and the nations that they are committing to 
helping have clear expectations and 
agreements binding peacekeepers 
to act accordingly. Peacekeepers 
must abide by their mandates and 
uphold all human rights framework 




The UN mission in Cambodia 1991 marked the first time that international aid agencies 
“raised the alarm over abusive behavior by UN peacekeepers…including them visiting brothels 
                                                   
50 It does not matter if the human rights framework is binding or not. This is because peacekeepers are ‘bound’ to uphold all treaties and 
declarations.  
Diagram 2: Depiction of the UN’s agreements with Host Countries and TCCs. 
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where some prostitutes were underage.”51 The then head of the UN mission to Cambodia 
responded with “boys will be boys.”52  In 2001, the earliest reported incidents of sexual 
exploitation and abuse (SEA) committed by UN personnel in West Africa began to surface.53 At 
this time the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGO Save the 
Children commissioned investigations into the SEA allegations reported in Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone in refugee communities.54 The reports that materialized “painted a very disturbing 
picture of widespread abuse” and were leaked to the media, which prompted public 
condemnation.55 This pressured the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to become 
involved and conduct a separate investigation, which was published in October 2002.56   
This report was divided into three phases: assessment of the scope of SEA, evidence 
verification and the investigation of new evidence.57 The team of investigators, lawyers and 
specialists concluded that “there is a genuine recognition on the part of agencies that sexual 
exploitation and abuse represent a betrayal of trust as well as a catastrophic failure of 
protection.”58 More importantly, due to the third phase of ‘seeking fresh evidence and 
developing new cases,’ the OIOS report became a catalyst for a variety of institutional policy 
changes and recommendations that came forth in the following years.59   
In the direct aftermath of the OIOS report, the Security Council expressed their “serious 
concern at the violence, particularly sexual violence, suffered by women and children during the 
                                                   
51Azad Essa, “Do Peacekeepers Do More Harm Than Good?” Al Jazeera, 9 Aug 2017, available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/07/peacekeepers-harm-good-170730091925152.html  
52 Ibid.  
53 These allegations are the first reported, but that is not to say that they are in actuality the first to occur. Prior SEA most likely has taken place 
but was not reported or made public knowledge. UN General Assembly, Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West 
Africa, 11 October 2002, A/57/465, 3. 
54 Security Council Report, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeeping Personnel, 20 February 2006, Issue 3, 5, available at: 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-1429245.php?print=true.  
55 Ibid., 5.  
56 Ibid., 5.  
57 Security Council Report, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeeping Personnel, 20 February 2006, Issue 3, 5, available at: 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-1429245.php?print=true. 
58 UN General Assembly, Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa, 11 October 2002, A/57/465, 26. 
59 Ibid., 3. 
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conflict in Sierra Leone, and [emphasized] the importance of addressing these issues 
effectively,” with the adoption of resolution 1400 in March 2002.60 From 2003-2005, some 
notable events included: Kofi Annan’s zero tolerance policy adoption, the adoption of new 
terminology, Conduct and Discipline Team establishment at UN Headquarters within the DPKO, 
comprehensive reporting on SEA in PKOs and the media’s increased reporting on cases of 
sexual misconduct.61 Each will be discussed in turn, in order to grasp the current literature on the 
topic. 
Although a “zero-tolerance policy” was put into effect in 2003 on any and all sexual 
exploitation and abuse, the 2005 Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report listed a total of  340 
allegations of SEA, a staggering increase from the 121 cases in 2004 and 53 in 2003.62 Once 
again, Annan enunciated that SEA “violates the fundamental duty of care that UN peacekeepers 
owe to the very people they are sent to protect and serve [and that the UN] cannot tolerate even 
one instance of a peacekeeper victimizing the most vulnerable among us.”63 Unfortunately, 
Annan’s zero tolerance policy does not seem to be reaching all UN peacekeeping personnel.64  
The number of SEA allegations continues to fluctuate over time; underreporting of sexual 
violence is a significant issue that must be acknowledged. There are many reasons that survivors 
choose to forgo reporting. Some of these reasons include: stigmatization, losing much-needed 
material-assistance, negative economic impact, threat of retribution or retaliation, lack of 
effective legal service, feeling powerless, lack of faith in the response and lack of knowledge of 
                                                   
60 UN Security Council, Resolution 1400, 28 March 2002, S/RES/1400(2002), 1. Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1400.   
61 Security Council Report, 4.  
62 Muna Ndolu, “The United Nations Responses to The Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women And Girls By Peacekeepers During 
Peacekeeping Missions,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 27(2009): 142. 
63 This letter was written by Annan in a Letter to the President of the Security Council in February 2005. Sylvian Roy, “Presentation on United 
Nations Efforts to Address Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 14 
November 2014, http://www.osce.org/secretariat/126771?download=true.     
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http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/2006/sea.htm.  
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the reporting process.65 An independent report noted that the underreporting of sexual abuse and 
a culture of impunity in peacekeeping missions play a large role in the allegations recorded in the 
prior paragraph.66 It was found that “UN personnel in all the missions…could point to numerous 
suspected or quite visible cases of SEA that [were] not being counted or investigated.”67 This not 
only affects data collection but also clouds progress, as it becomes difficult to track true 
‘success’ in combatting SEA. 
 
Terminology and Use of Language: 
The terminology associated with SEA in UN mandates and other stated policy can have 
an effect on peacekeepers. In ST/SGB/2003/13, Secretary-General Annan defined ‘sexual 
exploitation’ as “any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, 
or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or 
politically from the sexual exploitation of another. Similarly, the term ‘sexual abuse’ means the 
actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or 
coercive conditions.”68 This definition is problematic; one scholar, Olivera Simic, examined  
nine empirical studies and performed a coded analysis in order to explore the language of SEA 
terms, causes and evidence gathering techniques.69 Simic concluded that the UN’s definition of 
‘sexual exploitation’ is too “broadly defined and contentious, and might cover activity that is not 
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necessarily sexually exploitative.”70 She contended that more research is required in this area and 
that the lack of questioning the “over inclusive and broad term of sexual exploitation” within UN 
mandates leads to the conflation of all sexual relationships to various forms of sexual offences.71 
The development of strong language used to convey SEA in UN mandates can make a difference 
in how regulations are perceived and comprehended by peacekeepers and host countries. In 
another document, the DPKO’s Code of Conduct, the following is clearly prohibited: 
-   Any type of sexual activities with children (persons under the age of 18 years); Mistaken 
belief in the age of a person is not a defense;  
-   Use of children or adults to procure sexual services for others; 
-   Exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex with prostitutes or others; - 
Any sexual favor in exchange of assistance provided to the beneficiaries of such 
assistance, such as food or other items provided to refugees;  
-   Visits to brothels or places which are declared off-limits.72  
Instead of analyzing how ‘sexual exploitation’ and ‘sexual abuse’ are framed, another 
scholar focused on the UN’s principle role of ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ and how that shapes 
SEA discourse.73 Currently, SEA is framed as a human rights violation. Although this is true, 
Grady argues that SEA by peacekeepers “brings about financial and propagandist benefits for the 
warring parties.”74 She suggests that SEA in PKOs directly benefits the enemy. In perpetrating 
SEA and indirectly helping warring parties achieve their goals, peacekeepers are in breach of UN 
principles of impartiality and neutrality that they are to uphold. Grady examines UN documents 
that explicitly use and define those terms. She concludes, “if impartiality is central to the 
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philosophy of UN peacekeeping, then anything that threatens it should not be tolerated.”75 By 
upholding the principles of neutrality and impartiality, the UN will face more pressure to combat 
SEA. Both Simic and Grady prove the importance of studying and coding UN documents for 
specificity in language to find trends that can help lead to change, whether it is by re-framing the 
issue (Grady) or advocating for stronger effective wording (Simic). 
 
Efficacy of PKOs – What is a Successful Mission? What is Peace? 
A PKO’s efficacy can be measured in a variety of ways. Scholars have suggested that 
some measures of peacekeeping’s utility can be found in the “compliance of ceasefires, troop 
quality, cost management, effective leadership, the combination of peaceful spells and stable 
polities, civilians protection from violence and an overall reduction in the levels of violence 
between belligerents.”76 For example, it has been argued that ethnicity and perceived impartiality 
of a mission commander influence the likelihood of a mission’s success.77 In another instance, 
the inclusion of women “as actors of peace and prevention” effectively protects civilians.78 
Conversely factors such as overly ambitious mandates, misallocation of resources, lack of 
preparation and the perception of shortfalls hinder the PKO’s end result.79 In this thesis, a 
mission’s success and efficacy is determined on the “basis of its ability to accomplish what it set 
out to do,” whether that is set out in a Security Council Resolution or mandate by another UN 
body.80  
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Lastly, the concept of ‘peace,’ has been highly debated. The issue centers on two schools 
of thought, theoretical and empirical; scholars have been challenged to move towards the 
operationalization of conflict, leaving behind theoretical concepts of positive and negative peace. 
Thus, the definition of peace “has only become more relevant as the [peacekeeping] field has 
adopted systematic empirical assessments of mission performance.”81  These new adoptions have 
allowed for a more nuanced understanding of peace in action. 
 
The Role of Peace Survival in Peacekeeping Missions: 
A crucial aspect in the discussion of peacekeeping styles has centered on peace survival 
and duration – both in long-term and short-term mission types. This type of literature is known 
as the “second wave” of peacekeeping research and assumes that “peace is an established 
condition and that a peacekeeper’s job is to maintain it.”82 However, since the UN does not only 
send troops into host countries post-conflict, but does so during ongoing conflicts, “missions 
should [also] be evaluated according to their capacity for making peace.”83 Since then, success 
has tended to be evaluated in terms of war duration, as opposed to peace duration.  
UN traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
have shown to “produce more durable peace, produce comparatively geographically contained 
conflicts, shorter episodes of local violence, improve the odds of peacebuilding success, and 
lower the odds of genocide over the long term” at the national level.84 On a more local level, 
scholars have found mixed results – peacekeepers are able to deter violence overall but this in 
turn weakens the duration of local peace.85 
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  There are only a few studies that focus on peace exerted during observer missions. It has 
been found that peacekeepers acting as observers have “no statistical impact on peace duration, 
battle-related violence, and geographic containment.”86 In fact, the only significant effect in the 
aforementioned study was a negative one; it was found that the greater the deployment of 
observers, the greater the intensity of one-sided violence, as these mission types are not viewed 
as a threat by perpetrators of violence.87  
 
The Gendered Approach - The Role of Masculinized Militarization and Patriarchy: 
Scholars Paul Higate and Marsha Henry have focused on peacekeepers’ perceptions of 
gender and gender relations on the field.88 A core component that affects the identity of males in 
the combat field is militarized masculinity, an aggressive form of masculinity; it was found that 
this trait dominated their identity formation whilst on tour.89 This show of aggressiveness by 
security personnel in combat is viewed as an acceptable trait within a militarized masculinity 
framework. This is because security personnel are taught to value “hegemonic masculinities – 
aggressiveness, courage, obedience, patriotism, stoicism, and loyalty – over feminine 
behavior.”90 Scholars have found a link between fostering of militarized masculinity and 
peacekeepers fulfilling UN PKOs. As PKOs become more multidimensional, “peacekeeping asks 
soldiers to do work that might normally be done by civilians – for example, promote human 
rights and organize elections.”91 The role of peacekeepers, as their name suggests, is to promote 
peace, quite the opposite from soldiers in violent combat. As such, this aggravates and 
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contributes to a male identity crisis, which in turn triggers a stronger hyper-masculine culture 
and allows for the tolerance of extreme SEA to evolve within PKO.92 
 In addition to militarized masculinity, patriarchy plays a role in the physical security of 
women. Literature suggests that there is “a link between norms of gender equality and reduced 
levels of abuse against women.”93 Karim and Beardsley argue that all societies are patriarchal to 
some extent but the amount of variation in the level of patriarchy correlates to the variation in the 
level of SEA that occurs across countries – the expectation is “for security forces that come from 
more patriarchal countries to be more likely to commit SEA”.94 If peacekeepers coming from 
more patriarchal countries are more likely to commit SEA, should they be allowed to engage in 
peacekeeping missions? Coupled with the submissive gender roles that women are burdened 
with and the power dynamics of why men rape,95 Karim and Beardsley have hypothesized that 
the composition of peacekeeping missions (peacekeepers by troop contributing country by 
mission type) will thus inform the levels of SEA accusations.96 
 Feminist literature on SEA’s relationship and the correlation to the role of male power in 
society is often classified as either: 1) all sexual relations are exploitative in nature or 2) women 
have autonomy over their choices. The first group has largely been criticized because they 
believe that “patriarchy is an organizing principle and … rape’s critical function [is] nothing 
more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state 
of fear.”97 Blanket statements in the first batch of literature suggest a static theoretical view of 
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rape and this in turn “restricts understanding variations across contexts.”98 The second group 
believes that women are in control of making their own decisions and that there are certain 
instances whereby certain sexual acts may or may not be considered SEA – for example, this 
group does not classify transactional sex as SEA because a woman would have had to make an 
autonomous decision to engage in sexual behavior. Although these groups are quite different in 
attitude, both agree that characteristics that are “most valued as ‘masculine’ are socially 
constructed [and that] masculinity must be understood as not a natural trait, but something that 
must be achieved.”99 Other scholars have found that the concept of “military masculinities offer 
a useful analytical point of departure in explaining the dynamics of these gendered power 
relations, since the majority of peacekeepers are combat trained military men.”100 In taking this 
approach, one must heed caution to not homogenize the category of military masculinities to all 
unintended consequences of peacekeeping missions.101   
 
Structural Conditions of SEA: 
Until 2013, literature on peacekeeping focused more on whether peacekeeping keeps the 
peace and less on why there are variations of unintended consequences of PKOs, such as SEA.102 
Although the prevalence of SEA is a major human rights concern, the variation in the data makes 
it difficult to analyze – some peacekeeping missions are marred by SEA scandal, others have few 
reported cases. As such, it is difficult to understand the factors that are responsible for the 
differences in reported SEA across missions and over time and whether structural conditions 
contribute to higher reporting of SEA. In spite of the fact that underreporting is likely a 
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significant problem, there are some case studies that suggest TCC/mission-specific factors and 
host-specific factors are responsible for this variation.103  
The first statistical study exploring SEA variation was conducted in 2013 by Ragnhild 
Nordas and Siri Rustad at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo. Nordas and Rustad found that 
“SEA is more frequently reported in situations with lower levels of battle-related deaths, in 
larger operations, in more recent operations, the less developed the country hosting the mission, 
and in operations where the conflict involved high levels of sexual violence.”104 Their clearest 
finding among those listed above pertains to SEA in larger operations; it was found that missions 
that had more troops on the ground had higher reporting of SEA.105 For example, in Cambodia, 
the number of prostitutes rose from 6,000 to 25,000 (including child prostitutes) due to the 
increase in peacekeeping personnel in 1992 in the whole country. The influx of peacekeeping 
personnel “acts as a magnet for an increase in the sex industry and sexually exploitative 
relationships in mission areas. This increase in demand of sex services also results in an 
augmentation in trafficking and forced prostitution.”106 Similar instances of an increase in 
sexually exploitative relationships can be seen in other missions, such as UNMIK in Kosovo.107 
 Another condition that relates directly to troop contributing countries and creates a 
thriving environment for SEA is peacekeeping personnel’s use of force. Since the majority of 
peacekeepers are soldiers who are trained to use force, there is this notion that they “might 
struggle in post-conflict [peacekeeping] environments requiring compassion, sensitivity, and 
empathy is well taken.”108 This framework looks at SEA as unavoidable and peacekeepers as 
“unthinking automatons,” who are only trained to fight “and gain power and control over the 
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enemy.”109  
TCCs avoid taking responsibility and have allowed for impunity to occur unchecked, 
which has contributed to causing SEA. Some TCCs lack the legal infrastructure to prosecute 
citizens’ crimes committed on foreign lands.110 TCCs also want to avoid political embarrassment 
in the eyes of the international community – “no country wants to be seen as the nation whose 
citizens, instead of protecting vulnerable people, go overseas and sexually abuse others.”111 The 
UN is still hesitant to ‘name and shame,’ as it might risk withdrawal from TCCs.  
Karim and Beardsley have also studied whether “the composition of peacekeeping forces 
along two dimensions—the proportion of women and the records of gender (in)equality in the 
contributing countries—helps explain variation in SEA allegations.”112 They analyzed mission-
level information in countries that had better records of gender equality in host countries and 
found there to be lower levels of SEA allegations reported against peacekeeping personnel.113 
This conclusion is ground-breaking, as it suggests that improving the representation of women in 
a host country will help alleviate the problem.114 Thus, by improving female representation in 
host countries, it is thought that the country as a whole will be able to have better records of 
gender equality. Unfortunately, these findings are worrisome, as they demonstrate another factor 
that could allow for peacekeeper impunity – peacekeepers blaming SEA on the host countries’ 
gender inequality issues. Host countries with poor female representation and gender inequality 
inadvertently contribute to SEA because if sexual violence is viewed as acceptable or a regular 
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After the release of 2005 Secretary-General’s report, the total number of allegations 
continued to increase to 357 in 2006.115 This increase resulted in thorough record-keeping and 
data tracking of all SEA allegations perpetrated by UN peacekeepers. In 2008, the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in conjunction with the Department of Field Support (DFS), 
launched the Misconduct Tracking System (MTS), a global method of monitoring allegations 
involving peacekeepers.116 After the inception of these data-tracking systems, the number of 
allegations reported in 2007 decreased to 59. Regardless of this promising decrease, since 2008, 
there have been a total of 839 allegations brought against UN peacekeeping personnel.117 
Furthermore, in mid-April 2017, the Associated Press released a report, sourced from internal 
UN Docs, detailing 2,000 allegations that have been made against UN peacekeepers over the 
span of 12 years.118 This release came shortly after the creation of a new task force to strengthen 
the UN’s response to SEA issues to “develop a clear, game-changing strategy to achieve visible 
and measurable further improvements” by new Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres.119  
The current studies that exist examine mission specific data and the failure of the zero 
tolerance policy; the missions that have received the most attention for SEA include 
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MONUC/MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo and MINUSTAH in Haiti.120 These 
case studies examine social, legal and political institutions that inadvertently contribute to SEA. 
In one case study, it was found that “the culture or context of the host country, the troop-
contributing country, the peacekeeping mission itself, and institutional issues within the DPKO 
and the broader UN system” contributed to the high rates of SEA in MONUC/MONUSCO.121 
Other scholars have worked to create their own comprehensive Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by Peacekeepers (SEAP) datasets, which compile limited public information from the 
United Nations, NATO, ECOWAS and the African Union from 1999-2010. Scholars also looked 
at NGO reports, media sources, and academic studies to compile datasets.  
Theoretical Framework  
Diana Russell’s four-factor model suggests the preconditions that allow rape to occur.122 
These four factors are: (1) factors creating a predisposition or a desire to rape, (2) factors reducing 
internal inhibitions against acting out this desire, (3) factors reducing social inhibitions against acting out 
this desire, and (4) factors reducing the potential victim’s ability to resist or avoid the rape.123 This 
framework was utilized by Nordas and Rustad in the first ever statistical study exploring sexual 
exploitation and abuse (SEA) variation. The reason that I am also choosing to utilize this 
framework is because peacekeeping operations are heavily influenced by these factors and allow 
for masculinized militarization to create a breeding ground for abuse. In these environments, as 
explained in the “Literature Review” section, men devalue women in the communities that they 
are supposed to helping. The prevalence of SEA is “higher when the men in the population hold 
negative views of women in their surroundings, when there is social acceptance for the behavior, 
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and when potential victims are vulnerable to targeting.”124 There is no denying that SEA is a 
systemic problem or that masculinized militarization, patriarchy and gender roles heavily impact 
the occurrence of such atrocities. Since my research aims to explore the relationship between 
troop contributing country (TCC)/nationality and SEA and whether or not there are other factors 
that can help explicate the variation in allegations, it is only fitting to adapt a similar theoretical 
framework and to use one that centers on sexual violence.  
 
Methodology  
This thesis aims to analyze the relationship between troop contributing country 
(TCC)/nationality and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), as well as understand if there is a 
correlation between TCCs’ norms and SEA variance. The dependent variable is the count of 
military, police and civilian SEA allegations in each mission; the independent variables are the 
TCCs. A quantitative and qualitative analysis will be performed in order to examine these 
relationships. 
An allegation is “an unproven report of alleged misconduct, which may not necessarily 
lead to a full-scale investigation.”125 The process for collecting allegations is as follows: 
survivors report allegations to a mission’s Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) by utilizing a 
“range of reporting mechanisms.”126 The CDU is in charge of tracking and reporting allegations 
to the Investigations Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) within a ten-
day period. The UN maintains “standards for the definition of SEA and for compliance with the 
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zero tolerance policy… although it is possible for norms of reporting abuse to be inconsistent 
across missions.”127 
The datasets used to test the questions of whether there is a correlation between TCC and 
SEA are the “Table of Allegations (2015 Onwards)” data available on the UN Misconduct 
Tracking System (MTS) and the “Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Country and 
Post (Oct 31, 2017)” provided by the UN. Results have been generated via Microsoft Excel and 
STATA. Results were then analyzed according to three indicators: Gender Inequality Index 
(GII), Gender Development Index (GDI), and Women, Peace and Security Index (WPS). From 
there, case studies of specific TCCs were examined to determine patterns amongst the highest 
perpetrating rates of SEA by nationality.  
Limitations of the data include: underreporting skewing the data, lack of civilian 
personnel’s nationality, limited data points from 2015-2017 and lack of data regarding non-SEA 
related allegations by nationality of uniformed personnel. Some years lack SEA allegations by 
particular groups, whilst others are inexplicably higher. For example, missions ONUCI, 
UNAMA, UNFICYP, UNIOGBIS, UNMIT and UNSCO have one allegation reported against 
UN military and police personnel from 2015-2017 – it is highly unlikely that there was only one 
instance of SEA during this two-year period.128  
Lastly, interviews with experts in the field were conducted to discuss the peacekeeping 
reform and to aid in the analysis. Specifically, they were asked about the feasibility of 
peacekeeping, their views on different models, SEA flaws within the current system, the role of 
nationality in SEA, and how they hope to realistically change the field (see sample interview 
questions in Appendix 4).  
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Findings 
In order to determine which nationalities of uniformed personnel from TCCs are involved 
in most instances of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), I examined the “Table of Allegations 
(2015 Onwards)” data available on the UN Misconduct Tracking System (MTS). This data 
specifies the date of an incident, mission, type of personnel (military, police and civilian), 
nationality and the result of actions taken against said allegation. This data, which includes 
nationality, is only provided from January 2015 onwards.129 For the purpose of this research, I 
have compiled the data from January 2015 to November 2017. 
The data compiled from the MTS database was separated into two different datasets on 
Microsoft Excel.  The first dataset is by the number of SEA reports received by the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). From January 2015 to November 2017, a total of 238 
“single reports” of SEA were filed. According to MTS, a single report of SEA is defined as the 
point in time in which a report is filed and “may relate to one or more alleged perpetrators, and 
may involve one or more victims.”130 After parsing through each report, a total of 399 
individuals were identified as perpetrators of SEA. These 399 individuals comprise the second 
dataset, whereby data is sorted on STATA strictly by the number of individual uniformed 
personnel who have perpetrated SEA according to the category of personnel and then by 
nationality. Both of these datasets include civilians as alleged perpetrators; yet, civilian 
personnel’s nationality data is unavailable on MTS.131 
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An initial comparison of the two datasets was conducted to determine which personnel 
type currently, as of 2015, is responsible for committing the most SEA. Personnel type – 
military, police or civilian – is a measurable variable on the nominal scale. It is apparent that 
military personnel, which includes military contingent members and military observers, accounts 
for the highest number of allegations of SEA, followed by civilian personnel and then finally 
police personnel, which includes UN Police and Formed Police Units from police-contributing 
countries (PCC). Figure 1 illustrates the number of single reports filled according to personnel 
type. Of the 238 reports filed, 30 reports or 12.61% were filed against police, 48 reports or 
20.17% were filed against civilians and 160 reports or 67.23% were filed against military 
personnel. Figure 2 depicts the number of single individuals which are listed as alleged 
perpetrators in the reports. Of the 399 individuals involved in allegations, 47 or 11.78% were 
police, 53 or 13.28% were civilian and 299 or 74.94% were of military status. Both datasets 
suggest that SEA is present across all personnel types and that there is no significant difference 
between police and civilians’ total number of allegations.132  
The lack of discrepancy between PCC and civilian personnel is troubling as it suggests 
that there is no difference between police and civilians’ total number of allegations. Moreover, 
an increased number of reports are filed against civilian personnel, compared to police. Military 
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accounts for the majority of both reports and individuals at 67% and 75% respectively in Figures 
1 and 2. This means that TCCs are responsible for the majority of SEA perpetrated from the data 
available. This reiterates the importance of examining the variation in SEA within TCC and why 
this group in particular is responsible for a higher number of SEA. 
Next, I examined the relationship between nationalities of uniformed personnel and 
SEA.133 Since MTS’s “Table of Allegations (2015 Onwards)” does not include the nationality of 
civilian personnel, all civilian data was excluded in the following analysis – only police and 
military personnel are included. Appendix 1 notes how this change was accounted for in STATA.  
The raw frequencies of SEA data were converted into percentages (see Appendix 1A and 
1B). This was completed for both datasets to determine which countries were responsible for 
having the most single reports filed against them and to determine which countries had the most 
individual allegations made against them.  
According to Figure 3, Congo  (DRC), South Africa, Congo (the), Morocco and 
Tanzania are the TCCs that have the highest percentage of single reports filed against them.134 In 
comparison, the top five TCCs with the highest percentage of individuals with SEA allegations 
                                                   
133 Henceforth, PCC are grouped within TCC, unless otherwise stated, as they account for all uniformed personnel from contributing countries 
134 Congo (DRC) refers to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo (the) refers to Republic of the Congo. 
Figure 3 
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Table 1: Ranking of Contribution 
by Country (as of Oct 2017) 
1. Ethiopia (8,409) 
2. Bangladesh (7,283) 
3. India (6,715) 
4. Rwanda (6,474) 
5. Pakistan (6,276) 
6. Nepal (5,352) 
7. Egypt (3,248) 
8. Senegal (3,210) 
9. Ghana (2,737) 
10. Indonesia (2,692) 
 
filed against them, in order from most to least, are Burundi, Gabon, Morocco, Tanzania and 
Congo (DRC). The data for these charts can be seen in Appendix 2. 
The three countries which have an overlap between the most single reports filed against 
them and most uniformed personnel implicated in SEA are Congo (DRC), Morocco and 
Tanzania. Congo (the) and South Africa are among the TCCs with the most single reports filed 
against them, whilst Gabon and Burundi have the most uniformed personnel as alleged 
perpetrators. Furthermore, Figure 3, in conjunction with Appendices 1A and 1B, shows that an 
increased number of single reports does not necessarily mean that the most uniformed personnel 
from that country perpetrated SEA. The converse is also true; a country can have a high number 
of individuals perpetrating SEA on UN peacekeeping missions, but it does not mean that there 
are a high number of corresponding single reports filed. For example, Gabon has 8 single reports 
filed against the country yet 33 uniformed military contingents were involved in perpetrating 
SEA. This means that more than one individual was involved in a single SEA report. Hence, 
Gabon is listed for having an abnormally high number of allegations against its uniformed 
personnel but not for number of single reports written against the country. It is important to 
consider this distinction. 
The top five nationalities perpetrating SEA, in 
both datasets, are incidentally not among the highest 
ranking TCCs to the UN. As of October 2017, there 
are a total of 125 TCCs that have collectively 
deployed 92, 506 uniformed personnel. The leading 
contributing countries are listed in Table 1 and 
ranked accordingly from TCCs that deployed the 
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Table 2: Rate of Allegation/TCC 
1. Congo (DRC) - 3.714 
2. Congo (the) - 0.135 
3. Moldova - 0.125 
4. Philippines - 0.083 
5. Gabon - 0.074 
6. Madagascar - 0.059 
7. Burundi - 0.057 
8. Canada - 0.048 
 
most troops.  To keep perspective, Ethiopia contributes the most uniformed personnel, which 
means that they only make up 9.09% of the overall UN armed forces. Indonesia, ranked tenth on 
the list, makes up 2.91% of the UN’s troops. As with the countries depicted in Figure 3, the ones 
listed in Table 1 are also considered developing countries according to the World Bank.135 It is 
significant to note that none of the seven countries illustrated in Figure 3 appear on the list of 
highest TCC. This can perhaps be attributed to the factors discussed in “Background 
Information: Troop- and Police- Contributing Countries” section, whereby it was mentioned 
that the UN entices Member States with a variety of benefits, including finances and elevation of 
status, in order to commit nations to provide troops. As such, on the basis of financial benefits 
alone, it is understandable to see more developing nations on the list of TCCs. 
 Although Congo (DRC), Morocco, Tanzania, Congo (the), South Africa, Gabon and 
Burundi are the countries that have the highest aggregate percentage of single reports and 
individual allegations made against them, further numerical analysis was conducted to determine 
if these seven countries are indeed the worst perpetrators in the dataset provided. In order to do 
so, the number of individual allegations must be compared to the number of troops that that 
specific nation contributed (see Appendix 3). By 
dividing the total number of allegations by the 
troops contributed, I was able to determine the rate 
of individual allegations per TCC. Table 2 
summarizes the highest proportions of the number 
of allegations per TCCs, rounded to the nearest 
                                                   
135 Using the list found here provided by the World Bank to categorize countries as developing or developed. Society for the Study of 
Reproduction, “List of Developing Countries,” SSR (n.d.), available at: http://www.ssr.org/DevelopingCountries.  
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thousandth. This is specifically for those with rates of 0.05 and above, which means that there is 
more than a 5% chance that SEA will occur by the TCCs listed. This table allowed for 
normalization of the data across missions and time (2015-2017), so as to not fall into the 
misperception of categorizing all developing countries as perpetrators.  
Of the countries listed in all of the datasets (see Appendix 3), only two countries - Canada 
and Germany - are developed nations. One would expect that these countries would have lower 
rates and rank lower overall as the rest are all developing countries. Interestingly, Canada is 
listed as 8th and Germany as 34th, out of 41 nations in Appendix 3. In comparing the data from 
Figure 3 to that of Table 2, one can see that not all of the top five countries with the highest 
percentages of allegations or single reports made against them have just as high rates of 
allegations per TCC. This indicates that although Morocco, Tanzania and South Africa, might 
have higher raw numbers and percentages of allegations against them, in actuality they have 
fewer SEA for the number of troops that they contribute. For example, Morocco is responsible 
for 8.09% of all individual allegations of SEA, which is equal to 28 instances of SEA frequency. 
Morocco contributes 1,610 peacekeeping personnel. As such, the rate for Moroccan 
peacekeepers to commit SEA is 0.017, which ranks 12th on Appendix 3. Conversely, Canada 
accounts for fewer instances of allegations - three - but also supplies fewer troops - 62. This 
means that the proportion at which Canadian peacekeepers perpetrate SEA over Moroccan 
peacekeepers is at 0.048, which is almost three times as much. It is also important to note the 
outlier in Table 2 is Congo (DRC). The rate at which peacekeepers Congo (DRC) from the DRC 
perpetrate SEA is 3.7 times the number of personnel deployed, which means that one 
peacekeeper has the possibility of committing SEA 3.7 times. In this instance, Congo (DRC) 
contributed 7 peacekeeping personnel but had 26 individual allegations against them – there are 
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more allegations than there are peacekeepers contributed. This means that Congo (DRC) has 
many repeat offenders and that there is a sense of impunity, as these peacekeepers are able to 
perpetrate SEA more than once on different occasions without being held accountable for their 
actions.  
The findings discussed above are quite shocking. The following chapter discusses the 
correlation between TCCs’ norms and SEA. This section will use indicators and interviews to 
help determine if there is a relationship between a TCCs’ gender norms and the peacekeepers 
committing SEA. 
Analysis 
This thesis ultimately examines whether peacekeepers externalize the norms that they 
have grown up with in their home countries. How can peacekeepers uphold certain rights, such 
as women’s rights, if they grew up in a country where that was not a part of the norm? How can 
peacekeepers effectively keep the peace and implement human rights if they themselves do not 
view the people they are supposed to protect as worth protecting? In order to answer these 
questions, the results from the previous section must be compared to various indicators that 
allow for a “better understanding of the foundational, fully internalized norms that peacekeepers 
bring with them” on peacekeeping missions. 136  
Gender indicators are used “for advocacy and can help make the case for action by 
highlighting key issues, backed up with statistics and other evidence.”137 They can hold 
institutions, in this case countries, accountable for their commitment to upholding human rights. 
Most importantly, gender indicators make the gaps between commitments that governments have 
                                                   
136 Bonnie Kovatch, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Case Study of MONUC and MONUSCO,” The Journal of 
Middle East and Africa 7(2016): 165. 
137 Justina Demetriades, “Indicators for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment,” BRIDGE, 2007, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/43041409.pdf.  
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made and the actual reality of what takes place visible.138 These gender indicators will in turn 
allow researchers to detect whether there is a correlation between TCCs’ (nationality) norms and 
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). The previous section determined that a positive 
relationship between TCCs perpetrating the most SEA via military contingents exists. The other 
components of data analysis showed that the rates present for the perpetration of SEA are quite 
startling, with both developed and developing countries on the list. The gender indicators will 
now allow for an analysis to take place to determine if TCCs with lower gender equality indices 
correlate to higher SEA perpetration. Correlation does not mean causation.  
The indicators utilized are as follows: 
●   Gender Inequality Index (GII) – is computed for 159 countries using information from 
the UN and the association-sensitive inequality measure.139 It measures gender 
inequalities in three aspects of human development: reproductive health, empowerment, 
and economic status. The GII is one of the better tools, compared to the Human 
Development Index (HDI), to “to better expose differences in the distribution of 
achievements between women and men.”140 
●   Gender Development Index (GDI) – provided by the UN and measures gender disparities 
in health, knowledge and living standards. Countries are grouped according to gender 
parity to show how much “how much women are lagging behind their male counterparts 
and how much women need to catch up within each dimension of human 
development.”141 
                                                   
138 Ibid. 
139 United Nations Development Programme, “Gender Inequality Index (GII) & Gender Development Index (GDI),” UNDP Human Development 
Reports, 2016. According to the UNDP, the latest data for both GII and GDI are from 2015. The data sets show an average of period estimates for 
2010-2015 and projections for 2015-2020.  
140 United Nations Development Programme, “Gender Inequality Index (GII),” UNDP Human Development Reports, 2016, available at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii.  
141 United Nations Development Programme, “Gender Development Index (GDI),” UNDP Human Development Reports, 2016, available 
at:http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-development-index-gdi.  
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●   Women, Peace and Security Index (WPS) - launched by Georgetown Institute for 
Women, Peace and Security and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo to measure 
“women’s well-being by assessing their inclusion, justice and security in a single number 
and ranking.”142 
In addition to employing GII, GDI and WPS, TCCs domestic laws regarding female 
representation and empowerment, sexual violence, domestic violence and abuse will be 
examined in order to determine the norms surrounding sexual and gender-based violence. These 
norms will be telling of the overall mindset of peacekeeping personnel from said country. The 
countries being examined are the ones with the highest rates of perpetrating SEA from Table 2.  




















Congo (DRC) 3.714 153 176 138 
Congo (the) 0.135 141 135 148 
Moldova 0.125 46 107 87 
Philippines 0.083 96 116 68 
Gabon 0.074 127 109 124 
Madagascar 0.059 N/A* 158 132 
Burundi 0.057 108 184 122 
Canada 0.048 18 10 7 
*Madagascar is missing indicator data and as a result was not ranked. 
 
                                                   
142 Jeni Klugman, “This Chart Shows the Best and Worst Countries for Women in the World Today,” The Washington Post, 7 November 2017. 
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/07/this-chart-shows-the-best-and-worst-countries-for-women-in-
the-world-today/?utm_term=.bec510e3e5ed.  
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Table 3 represents all of the rankings that correspond with GII, GDI and WPS for the 
TCCs with highest rates of individual SEA allegations. A higher ranking means that the index 
gap between males and females is large; the lower the ranking the better the country is doing 
according to that measure.  
It is expected that the more developed a nation, gender indicators will show a smaller 
equality gap between men and women and that that TCC will have a lower ranking. As expected, 
Canada has low rankings across all three indices. In fact, Canada is tied with the United States 
for 10th in GDI ranking. This means that there is a greater equality among males and females in 
health, knowledge and living standards. Moldova and the Philippines had somewhat average 
rankings, whilst Congo (DRC), Congo (the), Gabon and Madagascar had much higher rankings, 
which means that they fared worse across the indices. A high ranking indicates more inequality 
along GII, GDI and WPS factors. According to these rankings alone for the eight countries, 
women fare the worst in Congo (DRC) in two of the three indices across the board. These 
rankings alone are not enough to determine TCCs’ societal norms. This is because it is difficult 
to determine how women are treated overall in comparison to the other countries. There is a lack 
of consistency across the indicators. For example, Gabon had relatively average rankings across 
GII, GDI and WPS in comparison to the other seven countries but there is no way to clearly 
determine if its gender equality correlates to its SEA. Only Congo (DRC) and Congo (the) seem 
to indicate that their high GII, GDI and WPS scores are related to high SEA scores – this is only 
because their rankings are consistent. However, due to sample size of the dataset used, causation 
cannot be determined; correlation is weak at best, as these results cannot be generalized by the 
rest of the TCC data points.  
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In fact, there are TCCs who scored higher inequality scores than Congo (DRC) and are 
not listed as alleged SEA perpetrators in the dataset. For example, both Yemen and Côte d’Ivoire 
scored higher than Congo (DRC) on the GII – this means that there is a larger inequality gap 
between men and women – and contributed peacekeeping personnel but neither country was 
listed as an alleged perpetrator of SEA. Therefore, this asks the question as to why these 
individuals are not on the list of alleged perpetrators. Theoretically, if they are deployed from 
TCCs that do not value gender equality, they should have higher rates of SEA. Yet, that is not 
true. 
 Interviews with individuals who are members of human rights organizations working in 
the area of sexual violence against women and who are considered experts in the field were 
conducted; this was completed in order to further investigate the rate of allegations per TCC.143 
The indices, although helpful in examining gender gaps and proving their existence, need to be 
supported by interviews from experts in the field. 
Subject #1, who is a member of a human rights organization based in Boston working in 
this area, echoed Stephen Moncrief’s work.144 She stressed the negative impacts of soldiers being 
socialized in sexually violent militaries. This in conjunction with soldiers’ deeply internalized 
norms of sexual violence in their home countries and the peacekeeping mission itself can breed a 
SEA prone environment.145 Subject #1 noted that “even though learning is layered in nature, 
there are key factors that can be pinpointed to help explain high levels SEA.”  The first layer “is 
gender socialization and that tends to occur during the primary socialization phase,” she relayed. 
Subject #1 emphasized that, “parents are responsible not only for influencing their own child’s 
                                                   
143 Due to the content of these interviews most subjects chose to be anonymous. In order to keep all interviews distinguishable in regards to who 
said what, each interviewee has been labelled a corresponding subject number, so as to avoid confusion.  
144 Stephen Moncrief, “Military socialization, disciplinary culture, and sexual violence in UN peacekeeping operations,” Journal of Peace 
Research 54 (2017): 716. 
145 Ibid., 715-716. 
  38 
gender development but also introducing their child to societal gender norms; parents show 
children what is acceptable behavior towards the opposite sex.” It is believed that the “strongest 
influence on gender role development seems to occur within the family setting, with parents 
passing on, both overtly and covertly, their own beliefs about gender.” 146 These lessons are then 
reinforced by a child’s peers, schooling, and societal experiences.147 Therefore, it can be deduced 
that parents are more likely to teach their children the norms they themselves have been 
indoctrinated with; few will deviate from the current gender equality climate of said country. 
According to Subject #1, gender socialization is an important factor that can help explain why 
TCCs with gender inequality issues result in soldiers more likely to commit SEA. However, it is 
not the only factor.  
As Subject #1 has worked with individuals who have completed field work in Kenya and 
the DRC, she has found that the social ideals about masculinity and gender roles coupled 
together help explain high levels of SEA. Subject #1 expressed that there is a strong desire for 
men to “achieve the social expectations for masculinity.” Social norms that emphasize 
masculinity in turn place an expectation on men to “have a high sex drive, to obtain multiple 
partners, to bestow gifts in exchange for sex, to be financial capable of purchasing one or 
multiple wives, and having the physical, economic, and social power to protect their wives from 
other men.”148 The high level of masculinity that men must perform at is a double-edged sword 
for society. This phenomenon is best described in Sara Meger’s work whereby she states that the 
motivating “factor for most individuals [to commit SEA] was the anxiety to fulfil [said] social 
                                                   
146 Susan Witt, “Parental influence on children's socialization to gender roles.” Adolescence 32, (1997): 253. 
147 Ibid., 253.  
148 Stacy Banwell. “Rape and sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a case study of gender-based violence,” Journal of Gender 
Studies 23 (2014), 45.  
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expectations” yet even in perpetrating sexual violence to assert male dominance, men are still 
unable to attain the masculinity they strive to achieve.149  
From the above interview, it became apparent that a cross-country analysis of TCC’s 
legal framework is necessary in order to better understand the norms surrounding SEA against 
women. Table 4 below summarizes key legal frameworks that address violence against women, 
the criminalization of spousal rape and the share of women in parliament. Table 4 is followed by 
more interviews from individuals in the field giving their opinions on the results and providing 














                                                   
149 Sara Meger. “Rape of the Congo: Understanding sexual violence in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Journal of 
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Rome Statute Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
CRC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEDAW Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 


















8 9 19 21 16 12 36 25 
 
A quick glance at Table 4 indicates major lack of gender inequality in the aforementioned 
countries. In fact, on paper, it seems as if the top perpetrators of SEA have the appropriate laws 
and regulations in place to prohibit these crimes. Even with the existence of these laws, these 
eight countries remain with the highest rates of allegation per TCC. All eight countries have 
signed and ratified the CRC and CEDAW, yet half of them do not criminalize spousal rape. This 
is ironic as CEDAW provides protection against sexual and gender-based violence. CEDAW is 
considered the “world's primary legal document on women's equality, that reflects the consensus 
                                                   
150 UN Women, “Justice Report: Get the Data,” The Guardian (2011), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2011/jul/06/un-women-legal-rights-data#data.  
151 Rape and domestic violence are prohibited. Spousal rape is not addressed within its Constitution or other laws. 
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of the international community on the specific protections and actions states are obliged to take 
to ensure equality between men and women.”152 For example, in the DRC’s domestic sphere, 
50% of women have experienced sexual violence. In these instances, the women’s abusers are 
their husbands.153 Marital rape is not criminalized in the DRC; it is considered a husband’s right. 
If a woman were to press charges or want to go to court, DRC’s Family Code stipulates that a 
woman must obtain her husband’s permission to access judicial institutions and is not technically 
a “prosecutable offense,” as customs do not recognize domestic rape as different from sexual 
and/or romantic relations.154 Since the DRC has ratified CEDAW, the country should actively be 
working to incorporate the Convention’s articles into its own domestic laws and regulations, as it 
is legally bound to do so. Similar to the DRC, the Republic of Congo has received reports from 
CEDAW monitoring bodies indicating that there is an absence of legislation pertaining to 
violence against women. Local NGOs APC and Azur Developpement feel that “the government's 
work has been insufficient in educating citizens and public servants with respect to human rights, 
prevention of violence and the treatment of victims, and the response from legal and health 
sectors is insufficient.”155 Thus, this raises a few more questions: why and where is the 
disconnect between the perpetration of crimes and laws in host countries? What other variables 
are responsible for perpetrating this issue?  
According to interviewee Subject #2, the disconnect that exists is “largely due in part to 
the lack of legal implementation.” Subject #2’s expertise is in examining global policies and 
institutions. She expressed that even though all of the countries listed in Table 2 have ratified 
                                                   
152 Human Rights Watch. “US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties.” (July 2009). Available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/24/united-states-ratification-international-human-rights-treaties.  
153 Ibid. 
154 Europal Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Domestic and sexual violence, including 
legislation, state protection, and services available to victims (2006-March 2012), 17 April 2012, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f9e5e532.html. 
155 Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Republic of the Congo: Violence against women, including sexual violence; state 
protection and support services (2013-April 2015), 15 May 2015, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5568271d4.html. 
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some sort of human rights framework, they seldom work to implement the treaty. Countries must 
create legislation that incorporates the articles from the Convention ratified. Nations must also 
take responsibility for regularly reporting to various UN human rights bodies because failure to 
do so results in violation of the terms of the treaty. Technically, that “country will be in breach of 
international law.”156 The reason for treaty ratification is often due to international pressure; 
countries maintain political, social and economic status when upholding treaties and display a 
pro international human rights gesture. 
Furthermore, according to Subject #2, failure to ratify treaties can result in “limited 
international influence, loss in stature and loss in credibility.” She further noted that, even though 
failure to uphold treaties places a country in violation of international law, there is little that is 
realistically done to serve as a deterrence. Subject #2 said that “treaties rarely have the effect that 
they are intended to have.” For example, the Republic of Congo passed Law No.71 in April 2016 
to be in accordance with CEDAW. Law No.71 states that “women and men must each make up a 
minimum of 40% of every political party’s candidates and of cabinet nominees.”157 This law also 
amends other national laws to prohibit sexist language and images in the media, establish a 
Gender Equality Coordination Group and expand the responsibilities of local public authorities 
on gender equality.158 Similarly, Burundi’s government passed a new law against gender-based 
violence in September 2016. This law promotes equal rights to education, inheritance and equal 
rights between spouses to family property. Critics note that this new law seems promising but 
fails to adequately address victims; no services, such as medical checkups, psychological 
evaluations, and compensation, are provided to victims. The UN High Commissioner for Human 
                                                   
156 Australian Human Rights Commission,“Human Rights Explained: How States Commit to Human Rights Treaties,”2017, available at: 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/human-rights-explained-fact-sheet-6how-states-commit-human-rights-treaties.  
157 UN Women, “Moldova Takes Historic Step to Promote Gender Equality in Politics,” 20 June 2016, available at: 
http://eca.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2016/06/moldova-takes-historic-step-to-promote-gender-equality-in-politics.  
158 Ibid. 
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Rights in Burundi, Patrice Vahard, described some articles within the new law as “very 
progressive” for the nation.159 These are both instances where TCCs are actively working to 
implement international human rights treaties, yet, both of these countries fared poorly according 
to gender equality indices and have some of the highest rates of SEA perpetration. Subject #2 is 
skeptical of these new laws and is unsure if the new “integration of international human rights 
treaties is serving ulterior motives.”  
Table 4 also illustrates another interesting concept – an upward trend of female 
representation in Parliament. Gender balancing in government is becoming more mainstream. 
According to Dr. Sabrina Karim, a Cornell Assistant Professor specializing in security sector 
reform, peacekeeping, and gender, gender balancing is a part of the culture. She believes that 
peacekeeping can be molded because “culture is not a static thing. It can definitely be changed 
and shaped and it’s just a matter of: 1) taking the time and 2) figuring out ways to chip away at 
the culture.” For example, Canada has a Prime Minister who has openly declared himself a 
feminist and assembled a governmental cabinet with an equal number of male and female 
ministers. In the Philippines, Filipino women are also heavily involved in these Parliamentary 
processes by regional standards, 30% are in the House of Representatives and 25% are in the 
Senate.160 Of the country cases listed, Gabonese women have the lowest percentage of 
Parliament Seats and often do not have a spot at the table. They are strictly viewed as their 
husband’s property.161 Gender balancing is slow to take place but it does eventually happen. 
In an interview with Subject #3, lack of stability was noted as a major factor for the 
continued allowance of rape to occur. In fact, Subject #3 said that “constant armed conflict has 
                                                   
159 Innocent Habonimana, “Burundi: Tough Law Against Gender-Based Violence,” 12 August 2016, available at: http://www.iwacu-
burundi.org/englishnews/burundi-tough-law-against-gender-based-violence/.  
160 Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, “Country Profile: The Philippines,” 2017, available at: 
https://giwps.georgetown.edu/index-story/the-philippines/.  
161 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, “Gabon,” N.d., available at:  
http://www1.uneca.org/awro/CountrySpecificInformationGabon.aspx.  
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placed the DRC in a precarious position. Women, in particular, are facing rape in both the public 
and private spheres. If laws are not upheld and a stronger stance on rape is not taken, nothing 
will change.” According to Human Rights Watch, there have been “horrific levels of rape” with 
“tens of thousands of women, girls, men and boys... who have been abused.”162 Women living in 
rural areas are much more susceptible to being attacked “than women in urban areas because 
they are less informed about their rights and are isolated from security services“163 Similarly, 
Burundi has also seen its share of conflict. From 1994-2006, Burundi was plagued with a civil 
war. Post-civil war, changes were made to start a greater inclusion of women and girls in society. 
Women entered paid work and international NGOs formed “partnerships with local groups to 
create an inter-agency referral system, enabling victims to benefit from medical, legal and 
psychosocial assistance.”164 However, in 2015, unconstitutional political bids for Presidency led 
to mass protests and over 400,000 Burundians fleeing the country. Reports of systematic rape 
and torture have once again emerged.165 Countries that are experiencing war and/or internal 
conflict are more prone to seeing women in a negative light and tools of warfare, as opposed to 
human beings. As such, the findings exhibited in the “Results” section is not at all shocking to 
Subject #3. In fact, finding troops committing SEA if they are being deployed from current 
conflicts in their own home countries where rape is nothing more than tactical warfare is to be 
expected. This can partially explain the high rates of SEA from Table 2’s TCCs. 
However, armed conflict and gender inequality in TCC seem to only partially explain the 
problem. In speaking with Sabrina Karim, underreporting and lack of prosecutions serve as both 
                                                   
162 Human Rights Watch, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Ending Impunity for Sexual Violence,” HRW, 10 June 2014, available at: 
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constraining factors and explanatory variables for the results achieved in the previous section. 
There have been vast improvements in how allegations are handled and how survivors are treated 
but it is “still incredibly difficult for any prosecution to occur in home countries…we don’t see 
those prosecutions,” Karim said. Furthermore, “even though survivors are treated better, it is 
difficult to report in the first place and [can be daunting to] go up against UN systems,” she 
expressed. In her peacekeeping research and fieldwork, Karim noted that peacekeepers “do get 
training on SEA and there are posters everywhere. It’s drilled into them and talked about a lot.” 
In an email exchange with Subject #4, an individual working at Public Affairs Section at 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support (DPKO/DFS), it was relayed 
that “key improvements in [the DPKO/DFS’s] prevention, response and follow-up effort [have 
been put into effect] to ensure accountability, in active partnership with the Member States.” 
This individual noted that DFS “provides troop- and police-contributing countries with training 
materials on conduct and discipline for their pre-deployment training…and a SEA e-learning 
programme has been developed.” It was stressed that it is the TCC’s responsibility to certify that 
they “delivered pre-deployment training on the prohibition of SEA to all uniformed personnel as 
part of the deployment requirements.” Furthermore, a no excuse card (see Appendix 5) 
“available in six languages is being distributed to be carried by all personnel deployed in the 
field to ensure all personnel will abide to the codes and conduct of the United Nations.” This 
individual declined to comment on TCC specific data. However, it can be surmised that similar 
to the TCCs ratifying international human rights framework, the UN has the mechanisms in 
place that allow them to vocalize that they have protocols. Whether these protocols are followed 
is an entirely different situation.  
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It seems as if SEA is heavily talked about and peacekeepers are made aware of the 
consequences and severity of their actions. Karim further pushed the difficulty in distinguishing 
between talk and enforcement in her interview. She suggested that people in leadership positions 
can change the culture through a trickle down effect and further that, “[understanding] gender 
equality [should be made] an important factor in considering those selected for leadership 
positions.” 
Subject #3, Subject #4 and Karim agree that the UN has and follows a thorough 
investigative protocol in place.166 Subject #4, the individual at DPKO/DFS, pointed out that in 
2015, a new 6-month timeline for investigation of cases, regardless of peacekeeper repatriation 
has been put into place. After the UN completes their investigation, they hand their information 
to the TCC responsible for the alleged perpetrator. It is then the country’s responsibility to decide 
to engage in the investigation. However, Karim has seen TCCs “either stall, not go through with 
the investigation or start the investigation from scratch and re-interview victims and it just 
doesn’t end up going anywhere; I’ve seen it happen a number of times.” The DPKO/DFS’s 
responses were quite straight forward in listing protocol but when confronted with the notion of 
what happens in situations such as Congo (DRC), where the rates states that the TCC’s 
peacekeepers are 3.7 times more likely to commit SEA, Subject #4 noted that the UN is creating 
a “repository of national laws of Member States and a call for states to assess their existing 
national legislations.” However, this once again places the burden on countries to modify 
existing legislation regarding sexual violence – this has proved futile in the past given the lack of 
inclusion of CEDAW articles in domestic law, for example. It also is another example that shows 
a disconnect between legislation and practice in developing countries. The second more useful 
                                                   
166 This is detailed in Diagram 1: “SEA Infographic” Management of Reports and Allegations Involving UN Personnel In Peacekeeping and 
Special Political Missions. 
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change taking place that Subject #4 spoke about was “promotion of criminal accountability by 
requesting Member States to establish on-site court martial proceedings.”  So far, only three 
TCCs have conducted such proceedings, none of which are listed in Table 2.  
Perhaps countries need to be held more accountable to following up on UN cases given to 
them. This can potentially be done by having the TCCs treat UN cases as legal cases – failure to 
prosecute should have direct consequences that are perhaps financial in nature. Furthermore, 
sanctions, or perhaps fines paid by individual peacekeepers, should be put in place to act as a 
deterrent. 
This analysis helps show that home cultures that fail to respect women are a part of the 
problem and they help normalize SEA. All of these countries have either signed or ratified 
crucial international human rights framework, but it seems that they are seldom implemented. 
How does the UN implement these human rights if countries’ governments are not willing to go 
beyond signing and ratification? Perhaps ‘naming and shaming’ is a move that the UN has to 
more strongly consider in order to hold these TCCs accountable to improving gender equality. 
Perhaps it is only once this occurs that peacekeeping personnel will be able to undergo a norm 
shift.  
The importance of this research shifts the analytical focus to the broader relations of 
gender equality in TCC. This is important as it begins to highlight potential variables for 
variation in TCCs and calls for consideration as to why this is. Interviews with experts in the 
field have also yielded potential explanatory factors of underreporting, economic sanctions and 
legal prosecutions, or lack of, as to why SEA, is high within certain TCCs. Furthermore, this 
research is important because it shows a shift in the UN’s mentality. In 2015, the United States 
delegation pushed for more transparency of who the perpetrators are – this led to the creation of 
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the database that was used to analyze the data. However, this new naming and shaming tactic 
that the UN has taken on does not take into consideration that the countries being shamed are 
also higher contributors. As such, this is why all of these countries were turned into rates in the 
“Data” section. In fact, it seems that it is more significant to see a low contributing country with 
a higher rate. According to Karim, this research is vital and one must make sure “we are not 
stereotyping countries or shaming countries based on numbers; it is important to be careful in 
how we are looking at the data.” 
Canada seems like an outlier at first in the dataset but perhaps it is just as important that a 
developed nation is on the list. A rate of 0.048 means that from the data provided, Canada’s 
military and police have a 5% probability of committing SEA. This is high, but it shows that 
SEA is not only a problem plaguing TCCs that are underdeveloped. Even more shocking is the 
rate at at which peacekeepers Congo (DRC) from the DRC perpetrate SEA; one DRC 
peacekeeper has the possibility of committing SEA 3.7 times. SEA truly is a pervasive issue that 
most likely affects every nationality from every TCC deployed, regardless of if there are single 
reports or individual allegations filed. 
However, it must be stated that based on the limited data sample, the relationship 
between SEA and societal norms in TCC does not have statistical significance. It is possible that 
the region in which DRC soldiers were in had higher rates of reporting or that soldiers from 
developed nations were more easily able to pay off their victims. Since the data is relatively new, 
dating back to 2015, there is not enough longevity for it to be conclusive, nor can it point to a 
specific variable. Yet, there is a relationship between nationality, gender inequality and SEA, as 
exhibited in Table 2 that is being explored for the first time; TCCs with high inequality rates, 
with the exception of Germany and Canada, are correlated to higher rates of SEA. Causation 
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cannot yet be determined. There is not enough consistent support to lend high rates of SEA to 
one variable or even a group of variables. As more data becomes available, it would be useful to 
be able to compare TCCs with high inequality rates but no SEA violations. This would allow for 
there to be much clearer indicators to determine the strength level of correlation between the 
variables. 
In this sense, these peacekeepers that have grown up with gender inequality as the norm 
have most likely, up until now, not had to think twice about their actions and how it affects 
women. In some of the countries mentioned above, where domestic violence is illegal yet 
authorities allow issues to continue, peacekeepers may think that the UN functions in a similar 
manner, regardless of their training. The reason for this is simple; this is because life in their 
TCCs is all that they have ever known, so why would women’s rights operate differently in other 
countries?167 The environment of impunity that thrives within the UN only further affirms to 
TCCs’ peacekeepers that their norms are accepted and that SEA is able to be.  
 
Conclusion 
The findings of this thesis show that there is a relationship between nationality/troop 
contributing countries (TCC) and SEA; gender inequality in TCC home countries is inconclusive 
as the explanatory variable. That does not mean that gender inequality, underreporting and lack 
of prosecutions do not explain some of the variation in SEA. It was also found that TCCs are 
responsible for the majority of SEA perpetrated from the data available, in comparison to civilian 
personnel. Furthermore, the proportions that were determined in Table 2 indicate further research 
is warranted. However, given the lack of data, causation between the data cannot be proven and 
                                                   
167 Paraphrasing interviewee Subject #3. 
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it is not statistically significant to generalize further than what is discussed within this thesis’s 
“Findings” and “Analysis” sections.  
The lack of systematic data on SEA, the short time frame of nationality record keeping 
and issues with underreporting have presented significant challenges in studying SEA. However, 
this is a valuable start with the data available, as it starts to discuss important issues of which 
nationalities are perpetrators and whether or not there are alarming trends, from the data 
available. SEA is often unreported and whistle-blowers are shunned. This is only the start of the 
“naming and shaming” era to hold TCCs accountable for their peacekeepers’ actions. Potential 
negative side effects could include TCCs choosing not to commit troops but hopefully, in order 
to uphold international peacekeeping standards and promote global partnership, TCCs will see 
that preventing SEA should be an agenda item. Due to the lack of data, it is possible that the data 
reported is the “tip of the iceberg.”168 However, this research’s importance should not be 
nullified due to too few data points, as the findings are still alarming for the datum available. 
The ever present question of closing the gap between TCC societal norms and 
peacekeeper SEA behavior variation still exists. Although this research did not intend to evaluate 
reform, there are a few ideas that came up during my research. Firstly, there needs to be better 
inclusion of women in peacekeeping. Women’s participation in peacekeeping has allowed for a 
“greater credibility of the forces, more effective protection efforts, higher reporting of gender-
based crimes and lower incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers.”169 This is 
echoed by scholars who have signaled that female peacekeepers joining the forces is one of the 
primary solutions for combatting SEA.170 The literature that exists surrounding gender and 
conflict speaks to the male dominated realm of international politics and the systematic 
                                                   
168 Nordas and Rustad, 530. 
169 UN Women, "In Brief: Peace and Security," UN Women, December 2013, available at: http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/peace-and-
security.    
170 UN Women, “In Brief: Peace and Security.”  
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masculine constructions that have overpowered women’s voices and experiences with matters of 
peace, war and violence.171 Conversely, feminist scholars have argued against the UN’s 
conclusions that “increasing the numbers of women does not necessarily translate into better 
outcomes.”172 However, it is an effort worth pursuing. Perhaps a leader with high gender equality 
norms, as Sabrina Karim said, can help change current peacekeeping culture via a trickle-down 
effect.  
Secondly, gender roles in TCCs need to be improved. Perhaps recruitment should only 
take place from countries that have scored high on equality indices or that have certain basic 
legal infrastructure to hold personnel accountable for their actions should they need to be 
prosecuted. According to the gender indices discussed in the “Analysis” section, a woman’s 
status differs drastically from her neighboring countries. This means that “regional high 
performers could be benchmarks for their neighbors, revealing a standard that surrounding 
countries could feasibly reach.”173 This is promising, as the “Analysis” section discussed, that 
countries within the past year are starting to employ better gender-aware laws. Furthermore, 
TCCs tend to be mostly developing countries who are paid per soldier per month; the decision of 
how much to pay peacekeepers is strictly on TCCs. Perhaps, economic sanctions or fines will 
help TCCs work in partnership with the UN to curb and eventually end SEA. Thirdly, there 
needs to be stricter regulation of a zero-tolerance policy. Most member states have signed 
international agreements to uphold women’s rights and to prevent SEA, yet few follow through 
on actions. International examples need to be made and perhaps jurisdiction changes as to who 
oversees judicial processes should be entertained, in order to make legal conventions realities. 
                                                   
171 This theme is presented in both Karim and Beardsley’s 2013 article and Higate and Henry’s 2004 article. 
172 Karim and Beardsley, “Female Peacekeepers and Gender Balancing: Token Gestures or Informed Policymaking?” 465. 
173 Jeni Klugman, “This Chart Shows the Best and Worst Countries for Women in the World Today,” The Washington Post (7 November 2017), 
available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/07/this-chart-shows-the-best-and-worst-countries-for-women-in-
the-world-today/?utm_term=.bec510e3e5ed. 
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To conclude, it is possible that peacekeepers externalize the norms that they have grown 
accustomed to in their home countries. However, it cannot be generalized for all countries nor 
can causation be established. Even though the DRC, Republic of Congo, Moldova, Philippines, 
Gabon, Madagascar, Burundi and Canada, were found to be substantially responsible for higher 
rates of SEA than other TCCs, exact causes for variation are unclear. Further, all of the countries 
listed have put forth some efforts towards bettering gender equality and women’s rights 
prioritization. It will be interesting to see, as more data is collected, whether generalizations 
regarding specific TCCs can be made and then whether it is possible to change from one’s 
conditioned home country norms to the UN’s international human rights framework. If these 
issues become realities, it will raise peacekeeping questions as to whether or not the UN will 
employ personnel from certain TCCs. More micro-level data needs to be collected, in order to 
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Appendices 
 
Data for Figure 1 from Stata: 
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Appendix 1: A new variable ‘nwoc’ was created to denote that tabulations and codebooks are 
looking at nationalities without civilian data. It has been named nwoc1 in the single reports and 
nwoc2 in the individual allegations for easy differentiation between the two. This explains the 
frequency total changes from those discussed in Figures 1 and 2.  
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Appendix 2: Data for Figure 3: Comparison Between TCCs with Highest Percentage of Reports 
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Appendix 3: Shows how I arrived at the rates in Table 2 (the number of individual allegations 
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Appendix 4: Sample Interview Questions – these were guiding questions. Interviews served 
more as conversations and I did not bind myself to only these questions.  
 
•   What do you believe is the UN’s position on sexual exploitation and abuse within 
peacekeeping? 
•   What do you think makes SEA a prevalent issue? 
•   How do you see changing this attitude? Or is it simply a part of the culture now? 
•   What role do Troop Contributing Countries play in dealing with SEA? 
•   What is the stance of the UN and gender balancing in practice compared to stated policy? 
o   Purpose of UN mandates in actuality? How do we make sure the peacekeepers on 
the ground understand stated policy? 
o   Why is there a disconnect between host country’s gender inequality norms and 
peacekeepers committing SEA? Factors that could be responsible for this? 
•   How can peacekeepers be better held accountable? 
•   Do you think that it is possible to change the socialization of UN peacekeepers in their 
home countries so that they do NOT perpetrate violence when they go abroad as part of a 
peacekeeping mission? 
•   Is it more a country’s norms or other factors that contribute to soldiers committing SEA 
abroad? If other factors, what factors affect SEA in African countries? 
•   What is _______ or the UN doing to combat this? Do you think it is enough or that more 
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